On Wednesday, March 20, Ukraine faced three significant developments. Firstly, responding to appeals from partner nations, Ukrainian authorities opted to close the website featuring the ‘international sponsors of the war’ list. Secondly, the European Union court overturned sanctions against Russian racing driver Nikita Mazepin, son of Russian oligarch Dmitry Mazepin, citing legal grounds. Thirdly, the EU court lifted sanctions against the Belarusian state-owned enterprise Belshina. Apostrophe delved into whether corruption played a role in these decisions and if they might signal a precursor to the full-scale lifting of sanctions by Ukraine's European partners.
Justified
On March 20, the European Union Court in Luxembourg overturned EU sanctions targeting Russian racer Nikita Mazepin. These penalties, imposed in March 2022 amidst Russia's invasion of Ukraine, froze Mazepin's assets within the EU and banned his entry into its territory.
Nikita Mazepin, son of Dmitry Mazepin, Uralchem group founder, was included in EU sanctions due to his familial ties to sectors pivotal to Russia's economy, linked to state revenue. The EU Council cited Dmitry's role in sponsoring Nikita's Haas F1 team activities, prompting the sanctions. Haas terminated Nikita's contract shortly after Russia's full-scale war on Ukraine began.
The EU Council extended sanctions against Mazepin Jr. three times (in September 2022, March and September 2023). The European Court of Justice suspended their effect, noting that the restrictive measures should not apply to the Russian's professional activity as a driver. However, the EU Council ignored these decisions.
Nikita Mazepin contested the sanctions in the European Union Court, resulting in their reversal. The court reasoned that the racer's familial ties with his father did not adequately justify considering their shared interests.
Mazepin Sr. previously appealed the sanctions against him, but the EU court rejected his plea. In its ruling, the court cited Mazepin Sr.'s presence at a meeting with Vladimir Putin and other Russian government officials on the first day of the full-scale war, where the impact of Western sanctions on the Russian economy was discussed.
The court stated that Mazepin Sr.'s invitation to the meeting ‘indicates his involvement in Putin's inner circle and his support or implementation of actions that undermine or threaten Ukraine's territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence.’
On March 20, the European Union Court nullified sanctions against the Belarusian state enterprise Belshina. These sanctions were unrelated to the Ukraine conflict but were imposed due to the Lukashenka regime's severe repression following the disputed 2020 presidential elections. The court found the EU Council's reasoning insufficient, as it failed to demonstrate Belshina's significant contribution to Lukashenko's regime or direct benefit to the Belarusian state. Belshina, supported by financial documents, argued it operated at a loss prior to sanctions and was not profitable. Additionally, the court deemed evidence of Belshina's involvement in repression against civil society insufficient.
This prompts questions about how to assess these decisions.
‘The EU Court maintains complete independence and refrains from any manipulation or corrupt behavior. I firmly believe in the validity of the court's ruling on Mazepin. It's crucial to note that the younger Mazepin lacks close ties to Putin and doesn't hold sway over his decision-making process,’ thepolitical technologist, director of the Situation Modeling Agency Vitaliy Bala tells to Apostrophe.
Mykhailo Pashkov, the head of the Razumkov Center's security program, agrees with him.
‘The EU Court is a collegial body and it is unlikely to be subject to corruption from the Russians or pressure from the EU. You can fully trust its decision,’ he tells to Apostrophe.
‘The instances I'm aware of where sanctions against Russians have been lifted adhere to basic standards of justice. Western public sentiment aligns with these principles,’ the expert of the Center for Civil Liberties, human rights defender Mykhailo Sava explains to Apostrophe.
‘Consider the case of race car driver Mazepin. The notion ‘The son is not responsible for the father’ is well-known. Who's willing to debate? I am certainly not. Despite this, his father, a Russian billionaire, remains under sanctions. The Mazepin Sr.’s inclusion in the sanction list stems from his attendance at a meeting with Putin. Hence, the criteria for imposing sanctions are stringent, making it implausible to discuss corruption or any judicial bias,’ – Sava said.
Are there no more war sponsors?
However, while Mazepin Jr.'s situation might still fit within the realm of ‘justice standards,’ the decision by the Ukrainian Cabinet to close the chapter on the list of ‘international war sponsors’ raises significant concerns. According to a statement on the Cabinet of Ministers' website, the decision stemmed from a meeting attended by top officials from various Ukrainian government bodies - the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Security Service of Ukraine, the National Security Agency, the National Security Council, the Prosecutor General, as well as ambassadors of Italy, Japan, Austria, France, Hungary, Turkey, the charge d'affaires of the embassies of the United States, Belgium, of Finland, Greece and EU representations in Ukraine, as well as representatives of the embassies of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Canada, Germany and the People's Republic of China.
During the meeting, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reported about ‘numerous appeals from diplomatic corps representatives of partner nations concerning the absence of a regulatory framework for the list's existence and the consequent detrimental effects on crucial decisions to counter Russian aggression.’
The Ministry of Justice opted to cooperate, asserting the impermissibility of disseminating such information on behalf of the state without addressing legislative concerns. The National Security Council underscored the existence of a State Register of Sanctions, deeming additional instruments unnecessary. Furthermore, the National Agency on Corruption Prevention, as highlighted in the statement, concurred that the website, incidentally under their jurisdiction, served no essential purpose.
Consequently, the decision was made to shut down the ‘international war sponsors’ page, with redirection to the State Register of Sanctions. Information from the site is slated for transfer to the Interdepartmental Working Group on the Implementation of the State Sanctions Policy, tasked with formulating recommendations for consideration by the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC).
‘The "International sponsors of war" list initially emerged as an emotional response from Ukrainian authorities to covert Russian aggression support. Its creators envisioned it as a reputational instrument. Had there been a regulatory framework with transparent and objective inclusion criteria, the list could have endured as an effective tool against aggression support. Unfortunately, this didn't materialize,' Sava explains.
As per the expert, the dismissal of this list is entirely understandable, given the stark disparity in criteria between Ukraine's perspective on supporting the war and that of the ‘collective West.’
‘The register of international war sponsors functions as a "list of shame." Although lacking legal authority, it significantly impacts the reputation of Western companies. This is evidenced by Hungary and Austria's demand to remove their banks, OTP-bank and Raiffeisen, from the list,’ the expert continues.
‘On the other hand, our authorities lack a clear understanding on this issue,’ Bala continues. ‘Consider this: French retailer Auchan was on this list, yet it continued operations both in Russia and Ukraine. So, what purpose does the list serve?’
The expert argues that without the enactment of a relevant law with well-defined criteria, discussing who should or should not be on this list is impractical.
"It's highly sensitive for Western companies and requires meticulous justification. In my view, the National Security and Defense Council’s sanctions register proves more effective", Bala believes.
However, all experts agree that the list of ‘international war sponsors’ was necessary and played a positive role.
Reject or not
The decision to close the ‘international sponsors of war’ register might be linked to efforts to engage China in the ‘global peace summit.’ This is indirectly evidenced by a publication in the Reuters publication. Sources cited in the article suggest that Ukrainian authorities felt compelled to take this action under pressure from Austria, Hungary, China, and France.
Furthermore, during a briefing in Kyiv on March 20, following a meeting with US President's national security advisor Jake Sullivan, Andriy Yermak, head of the President's Office, expressed cautious optimism about China's potential participation in the peace summit.
Closing the list of "international war sponsors" and lifting sanctions on some Russian citizens is not a general rejection of the sanctions policy, Mykhailo Sava believes.
‘A fundamental principle to remember is that guilt must be established. Without guilt, there should be no sanctions. Removing individuals from the sanctions list, as far as I'm aware, is about rectifying errors rather than abandoning sanctions altogether. Furthermore, new sanctions are in the pipeline targeting Russian officials, individuals, and organizations. For instance, the Ukrainian human rights organization Center for Civil Liberties has proposed a dedicated sanctions package in their "Strategy for the Liberation of Civilians" to target those responsible for the unlawful detention of Ukrainian civilians’, Sava said.