Local elections in Ukraine took place in rather difficult conditions: the coronavirus epidemic, a new electoral system, decentralization and a growing conflict between the center and the regions. Despite some irregularities, the election was considered to have been democratic and free of systemic rigging. However, counting votes and determining a clear “winner” in these elections did turn out to be quite problematic. After election day, chaos ensued as nearly every large party started to claim victory. Counting votes and drawing the correct conclusions proved to be more difficult than in previous elections. The ICPS has therefore gathered all relevant data and applied the criteria for determining who actually is the winner of this year’s local elections.
The main problems of this election and how to solve them
Despite the complexity of the new electoral system, Ukrainians managed to adhere to it and voted for both the parties and specific candidates to their liking. Mandates were, more often than not, given to those who were popular and received the highest number of votes, rather than just the first name on the list. However, it would be deemed more democratic to give the votes a more decisive role in determining the arrangement of the candidate list, rather than allowing it to be so dependent on the party leadership. It is therefore advisable to amend the Electoral Code in such a way that the sequence of seats within the party directly depends on the number of votes received in the constituency. It would be logical for the voter to have the opportunity to form the order in the general list of candidates.
Enforcing party-driven elections in communities of up to 10,000 voters was a failure. Aside from the fact that it heavily contributed to the sale of “political franchise” to local elites, it also led to the refusal of activists to run due to their unwillingness to associate themselves with any (corrupted) political projects. Inevitably, this made it impossible for them to run for office. In general, the existence of this norm did not improve party building. Therefore, independent candidates should be allowed to run in communities with up to 90,000 voters.
The overwhelming victory of local parties in certain oblasts and cities, has led to certain parties receiving a decision-making monopoly in these councils. This is a matter of concern, as under certain conditions it may contribute to the rise of separatism in Ukraine. This problem can be solved by reviewing the qualification requirements for electable parties.
The formation of election commissions, in which small parties continue to trade quotas for members and heads of commissions, is an issue deserving of attention. The Electoral Code still has some work to do in this regard. It is necessary to establish certain threshold requirements for parties that can be involved in the formation of election commissions. Another issue that must be settled as soon as possible is the “candidate clone”, a strategy that led to the candidate changing his name and/or surname into that of a more famous politician, which was widely used these elections. Although the state can’t deprive an individual of his constitutional right to change his name, it would be a possible solution to write the candidate’s previous name in brackets next to his current one if such a change (for example) took place less than a year before election day.
The simplification of the procedure to change one’s election address has also been deemed to be problematic. On the plus side, this approach has allowed internally displaced persons to exercise their right to vote. On the downside, however, the oversimplified system has led to falsifications. The number of voters in small but resource-intensive communities has increased many times over, which has significantly affected the election results. A simple mechanism is justified in national elections, especially in presidential elections, when a change of address does not affect the actual outcome of the election, but for local elections it is necessary to prescribe other rules. A more European approach would be to conclude that the residents who have been living in the area for several years and paying taxes there should be given the right to vote.
A positive trend in these elections is the reduction in the number of direct voter bribery. This has been achieved by increasing accountability by classifying the act as a serious crime. Additionally, the responsibility no longer solely lies with the individual who offers the bribe, but also with those who accept it.
This election’s biggest problem turned out to be the counting of votes and the formation of the voting results. Not all members of the commissions were prepared for a difficult calculation and the votes had to be re-counted several times, taking into account all the nuances of the new electoral system.
These remarks trigger a broad discussion on necessary improvements to the electoral legislation within the expert community, civil society in general and parliamentarians. The sooner the appropriate amendments are made to the Electoral Code, the better, as making these changes immediately after the facts is a sure-fire way to address these problems most effectively.
Who won?
The day after the vote, the largest political parties, such as “European Solidarity” and “Opposition Platform – For Life” rushed to declare themselves the winner. The media channels affiliated with these parties began to spread narrative that the current authorities had failed and early parliamentarian elections were an urgent necessity, despite having little grounds to claim so.
The truth is that the vote counting is still ongoing. However, the (near-)definite results of almost 1,200 local councils (of the 1,577 in total in the country) are in. If we take the total number of seats in all councils, we have the following results:
|
The name of the political party who nominated the candidate, or self-nomination |
Number of elected deputies |
% |
|
Self-nomination |
6385 |
18.96 |
|
POLITICAL PARTY “SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE” |
4908 |
14.57 |
|
Political party all-Ukrainian union “Fatherland” |
3500 |
10.39 |
|
POLITICAL PARTY “FOR THE FUTURE” |
3146 |
9.34 |
|
POLITICAL PARTY “OPPOSITION PLATFORM – FOR LIFE” |
2994 |
8.89 |
|
POLITICAL PARTY “EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY” |
2884 |
8.56 |
|
Political party “OUR COUNTRY” |
1344 |
3.99 |
|
Political party all-Ukrainian union “Freedom” |
717 |
2.13 |
|
POLITICAL PARTY “Groysman’s Ukrainian Strategy” |
477 |
1.42 |
|
POLITICAL PARTY “PROPOSITION” |
438 |
1.30 |
|
Political party “Radical Party of Oleg Lyashko” |
447 |
1.33 |
|
Political party “Strength and Honour” |
442 |
1.31 |
|
POLITICAL PARTY “TRUST” |
388 |
1.15 |
|
POLITICAL PARTY “NATIVE ZAKARPATTYA” |
341 |
1.01 |
The remaining political forces received less than 1% of the seats in the country as a whole.
The most successful candidates were those who were self-nominated, an option chosen by many local politicians. The runner-up is the “Servant of the People” party, which, as a result of its success, will now be represented on a local level throughout the entire country. Seeing as they come from a position where it wasn’t represented at the local level at all, this is a very good result. Despite occupying third place in the number of representatives elected, “Fatherland” didn’t pre-emptively declare election victory, unlike “European Solidarity” and “Opposition Platform – For Life”, even though it managed to receive significantly more votes than the latter parties. “Fatherland” continues to maintain a strong core electorate, especially in villages and rural settlements. Although it has dealt with a lot of push-backs in recent years, it is definitely too early to write this political party off. Lastly, it is worth mentioning “For the Future’s” results, which bypassed established political forces, such as the previously mentioned “Opposition Platform” and “European Solidarity”.
With regard to the elections for the regional councils, the situation there is as follows: "Servant of the People" wins in four regions - Dnepropetrovsk, Zhytomyr, Sumy, and Chernivtsi; “Opposition Platform – For Life” is also in the lead in four oblasts - Odesa, Mykolaiv, Kherson and Zaporizhia; the situation is the same for “European Solidarity”, they occupy first place in four oblasts - Kyiv, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil; "For the Future" is in the lead in two oblasts - Khmelnytsky and Volyn; in Cherkasy, the party “Cherkashchany” wins, in Chernihiv -"Ridnyj Dim", in Kharkiv - "Kernes’ Bloc", in Vinnytsia – “Groysman’s Ukrainian Strategy”; in Zakarpattia - "Native Zakarpattya", in Ivano-Frankivsk - "Freedom", in Kirovograd - "Fatherland" and in Poltava - "Trust".
No party has a singular majority in the regional councils, requiring all parties to seek political alignments, which will most likely fluctuate and change, depending on the particular issue that must be voted on. Local parties owe their victories to the local elites, who lent out their people to local councils. In general, though, the relevance of local political parties lies much lower in the regions than expected. “Servant of the People” ended up with good results, further enabling their crucial role in the country’s entire political decision-making process. Compared to 2015, “European Solidarity” has nose-dived drastically, failing to replicate the previous success of “Bloc Petro Poroshenko”. In this election, “Opposition Platform – For Life” expanded the geography of its electoral field, gaining representation in the central regions as well. The election also showed that Yulia Tymoshenko's “Fatherland” still enjoys stable electoral support.
According to the number of elected city, town, and village mayors we have the following results:
|
Party/Self-nomination |
Elected number |
% |
|
Self-nominated |
646 |
47.71 |
|
POLITICAL PARTY “SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE” |
219 |
16.17 |
|
POLITICAL PARTY “FOR THE FUTURE” |
89 |
6.57 |
|
POLITICAL PARTY “OPPOSITION PLATFORM – FOR LIFE” |
53 |
3.91 |
|
Political party all-Ukrainian union “Fatherland” |
49 |
3.62 |
|
POLITICAL PARTY “EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY” |
37 |
2.73 |
|
Political party “OUR COUNTRY” |
42 |
3.10 |
|
POLITICAL PARTY “GROYSMAN’S UKRAINIAN STRATEGY” |
28 |
2.07 |
|
POLITICAL PARTY “TRUST” |
23 |
1.70 |
|
POLITICAL PARTY “PROPOSITION” |
18 |
1.33 |
|
POLITICAL PARTY “NATIVE HOME” |
16 |
1.26 |
|
Political party all-Ukrainian union “Freedom” |
17 |
1.18 |
All other parties have less than 1% of the heads of settlements in the country as a whole.
Almost half of all elected heads of settlements are self-nominated. This reaffirms the thesis that authoritative local politicians prefer to adapt a non-partisan status. Among the political parties, the first place goes to "Servant of the People". This party failed to obtain even one regional head, but still managed to outnumber the runner-up party, “For the Future”, with at least 2.5 times the amount of elected individuals. “Opposition Platform – For Life” got 4 times less people elected than the pro-government political force.
Conclusions
"Servant of the People" continues to lead the electoral preferences of Ukrainians, even at the local level. They have received real tools to influence local politics and the state of affairs in particular areas. How they will handle this opportunity, is an open question. “Opposition Platform – For Life” and “European Solidarity” continue to be each other’s polar opposites, enjoying most support in the Eastern/Southern and Western Oblasts, respectively. The "Servant of the People" still represents the center of the political spectrum, acting as a middle ground between different cities, communities and regions. "Fatherland" continues to hold the rural and settlement electorate in its grasp, which ensures them a high number of seat.
It is too soon to be talking about early parliamentary election, despite the insistence of “Opposition Platform – For Life” and “For the Future”. However, if you do the math, it seems impossible that these political parties will manage to establish any strong foothold by enforcing early parliamentary elections, so there’s simply no point to invest resources in a new election campaign. Additionally, the President is currently lacking any constitutional grounds for the dissolution of the Verkhovna Rada.
The unresolved problem for the authorities in many regions remains the relationship between the central government and local elites. Despite the systematic reset of power triggered by the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2019, these local elites have not seen their powerful positions diminish in the slightest.
