Continuing his official visits, this week Volodymyr Zelensky visited Paris and Berlin. Despite his pre-election campaign focusing on promises of drastic change and regulation of the conflict in Donbas, the President is yet to define his peace plans and foreign policy initiatives. Moreover, Zelensky’s statements during his first foreign visits sounded rather similar to Poroshenko’s speeches: the same rhetoric, yet spoken in a much worse English. Why Zelensky chose to repeat Poroshenko’s foreign policy as his strategy, and what kind of results it might have – the analyst of the International Center for Policy Studies ANASTASIA HALUSHKA reflects.
Zelensky’s (vague) promises
Newly elected president Volodymyr Zelensky promised both a lot and very little during his pre-election campaign. His foreign policy was mainly focused on three premises:
- Peace in Ukraine, without concessions. All territories must be returned.
- Requesting support from European partners and signatories of the Budapest memorandum.
- Continuous movement towards NATO and EU.
His promises were lacking in both coherence and strategy. To anyone who has the slightest expertise in Ukrainian politics, it was clear that these goals were set by someone who lacked a concrete step-plan. Policy specialist and activists remained unsatisfied and hotly debated how this narrative would be filled in.
Zelensky and his team meanwhile remained tight-lipped about their foreign policy. Zelensky rarely ever talked to the press during his pre-election campaign, and the people he surrounded himself with referred to the program or stuck to the same, chewed out narrative, without offering any more insights. Even at the eve of Zelensky’s election as president, no-one – possibly not even Zelensky himself – knew what exact steps would be included in a concrete 5-year foreign policy plan.
The mystery didn’t just cause internal insecurity – it also spread to Ukraine’s foreign partners. No-one knew what to expect from Zelensky or what his real motives were, and so speculations ran rampant. If anything can be derived from the joint letter of Donald Tusk and Jean-Claude Juncker to president Zelensky, it’s that the EU was nervous, to say the least, about Zelensky’s plans for Ukraine.
Heading straight into the heart of international diplomacy, Zelensky obviously had one goal in mind: ensuring his international partners that, despite internal turbulence, Ukraine won’t stray from the pro- EU and NATO narrative that has dominated Ukraine’s political landscape for the past 5 years. His visit was a clear demonstration of Ukraine’s main priorities in foreign policy and the rhetoric it’s accompanied by. Luckily for the West, but sadly for Ukraine, not much has changed.
NATO-membership – a dream of the people?
The general briefing of the new Ukrainian President and NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg didn’t contain anything new. Zelensky ensured everyone that Ukraine will continue working on internal reforms, particularly those concerning the security and intelligence services, which are necessary to ensure closer cooperation with NATO. Decisive as his statements may have been, there remains a very palpable absence of meaningful ideas and concrete proposals.
Although the Donbas war wasn’t supposed to be the main theme of Zelensky’s visit to Brussels, it’s notable that this became a dominating topic, since his foreign policy largely rests on the promise to end the bloodshed in the East. And so, in his speech, Zelensky clearly repeats the standard formula of Russia being the aggressor state and the West’s responsibility to continuously exercise pressure. Alignment with the Poroshenko narrative couldn’t be clearer. Yet in some ways he does deviate from it, like when he suggests renewed negotiations and talks with Russia – an emphasis that hasn’t been made by many presidential candidates, due to lack of popularity (and results). Zelensky stresses he wants Ukraine to become “stronger in economic, political and military terms” before commencing such talks.
When negotiating with a stronger rival, it’s indeed important to establish one’s own strengths prior to such meetings. It’s even better to enjoy the support of strong allies. Yet the status quo remains what it has always been: Ukraine wants to join the alliance (and has consolidated it in its Constitution) and NATO’s doors remain open. Unfortunately for us, our actual membership isn’t decided by the Secretary General, but by the Heads of the member states, who aren’t swayed so easily.
Zelensky’s current job is to create a concrete step plan on what Ukraine will want to accomplish in the next five years, and how this will resonate in its foreign policy relations for the next 10-15 years. It’s also important to create a realistic vision on what can be achieved in Ukraine’s relationship with Russia and how Ukraine must navigate the complexities of Crimea and the Donbas region. Repeating the chewed out narrative from the past will force Ukraine to remain stuck in a dead end, which is something Zelensky’s presidency won’t survive.
So far, we see no novelty, nor enthusiasm, except for Zelensky’s surprise “consultative referendum” on NATO membership. This announcement was met with exasperation and cynicism. It’s a cheap and easy way to propagate inclusion of the people in his decision-making process, but that doesn’t mean it’s the wisest choice, especially in a country where the main source of information – the media – is ruled by oligarchs. Referenda – as the Brexit disaster shows – are unreliable indications of the public opinion, which depend too much on a variety of difficult-to-control factors. It’s questionable, at best, whether Ukrainian foreign policy should be based on such a decision-making process.
All in all, Ukraine can satisfy itself with a small success: NATO plans to conduct a joint military exercise in the Black Sea with the Ukrainian army in July. It’s clear that Zelensky has managed to calm down the international insecurities and that business as usual can continue. Further political and practical support will take place, with 40 million euros being allocated to Kyiv for further development.
The EU and Ukraine – a (one-sided) love story
Volodymyr Zelensky’s joint statement with the president of the European Council, Donald Tusk, was equally lacking in innovation. The same message was repeated: Ukraine won’t stray off course. Zelensky thanked the European Union for its continuing support and noted the importance of the EU’s sanctions in containing further Russian aggression. He stressed the premise that a stable, democratic and strong Ukraine is beneficial for Europe and Tusk reciprocated this sentiment by noting that, without Ukraine, there is no Europe.
However, Zelensky also explicitly mentioned his hope for the current partnership to transform into a full-fledged alliance, recognizing that this is a long-term plan. This was a missed opportunity for the president to establish, in cooperation with the EU, a set of short-term goals, which he could turn into significant achievements for Ukraine.
Because, despite the fact that euro-integration will and must remain a priority in Ukraine’s foreign policy agenda, there’s no avoiding the fact that it won’t turn into reality for the next twenty years. Building a foreign policy initiative on the basis of it will only cause frustration with Zelensky’s voters, who can run him out of office just as easily as they’ve put him in it. In Brussels, Zelensky had a chance to invoke the current Association Agreement as an instrument to create more concrete and intensified cooperation, but he didn’t take it.
Firstly, Ukraine must encourage the EU to keep investing in national funds, programs and projects. The eventual goal of creating a tighter cooperation and obtaining the four freedoms (goods, services, capital and labour) would be a first fundamental and attainable step, but can’t be accomplished without continuous and intensive dialogue. Otherwise we risk stagnation in effort and motivation.
Secondly, it’s time for the EU to re-establish itself in the process of peaceful conflict-settlement in the Donbas region. Ukraine has to reinforce cooperation with the EU in this prospect and encourage import of expertise and knowledge on how to navigate the current situation into a post-conflict era where transitional justice and reconstruction can become the main goals. It’s Zelensky’s task to lobby the needs of the Ukrainian people and involve European decision-makers in this process. EU funding will be crucial in this regard and has to be ensured as much as possible.
This week, Zelensky has set out on the task to re-establish the relationship with Ukraine’s most important European backers, Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel. This move in itself is one that deserves encouragement, yet the content of his meeting with French President Macron was little news-worthy. French President Macron stressed his support for Ukraine in the Donbas war and the necessity of further negotiations in the Normandy format. Before this happens, however, France wishes to witness certain gestures to ensure that the renewed commitments will be fulfilled. The message is, once again, very clear: “Play nice and we’ll continue to support you”.
What Zelensky’s visit seems to have achieved, is a resumption of the Normandy Format in the framework of the Minsk process. It’s obvious that Zelensky’s intentions were to ensure the support of both European strongholds before rebooting the negotiations, and so far it looks as if he’s gotten it.
Ending the war in Donbas and returning the annexed Ukrainian territories was Zelensky’s main foreign policy pillar in his pre-election campaign, and apparently he’ll be damned if he doesn’t repeat that every chance he gets. Yet, both in France and in Germany, he makes one mistake that stands out. Zelensky naively states that the only key to peace in Ukraine is the maintenance of pressure on Russia through sanctions and diplomacy. In Germany, Zelensky repeats this by saying that sanctions are the only way to end the war in Eastern Ukraine. It’s as if Zelensky is unaware of the fact that this type of pressure has been exercised on Russia for the past five years and that its effects have been very little. One would almost think that Zelensky has copy-pasted Poroshenko’s statements straight out of 2014, thinking they can still pass as innovative in the war-riddled Ukraine of 2019.
It would have been refreshing to witness Zelensky push the old narrative through into a new dimension, where he establishes the rules of the game and sets out his expectations of a renewed EU-Ukraine partnership. Repeating the chewed-out statements of Poroshenko’s administration made for a safe, albeit insignificant, first encounter. As a result, the EU renewed its sanctions against Russia for another year and confirmed that the next EU-Ukraine summit will take place in Kyiv on July 8. It’s a comfortable tit-for-that approach: if Ukraine sticks to the same old discourse, then so will the EU.
Poroshenko and Zelensky – same narrative, different historical context
Whether they’d like to admit it or not, Zelensky and Poroshenko both seem to have started off their presidential terms on a similar foot. Both Zelensky and Poroshenko were elected president with a startling majority – though Poroshenko obtained his in the first round, whereas Zelensky bagged his victory in the second round. Both of them weren’t affiliated with a political party when they ran for president and created their party post-election.
Notably, both were/are dealing with an angry and frustrated electorate. Poroshenko-supporters in 2014 were outraged over the bloodshed in the East and frustrated with Yanukovych’s inadequate administration. Zelensky-supporters in 2019 are outraged over Poroshenko’s broken promises and frustrated with the unceasing Donbas war.
But the resemblance doesn’t stop there. Incumbent president Poroshenko’s first foreign visit took place on the 26th and 27th of June, 2014. He travelled to Strasbourg, France, where he addressed the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and then proceeded to Brussels, where he attended the signing ceremony of the – once controversial – Ukraine-EU Association Agreement. As mentioned, Poroshenko’s priorities at the time were the same as Zelensky’s are now: EU and NATO.
Unsurprisingly, at the time, when Poroshenko was elected president, he was eagerly and warmly supported by both Washington and Brussels, who were keen to see some stability return on Europe’s eastern frontier. With Zelensky’s friendly welcome in Brussels and considering the fact that he has received an invitation from the Trump Administration to come visit the American President, we can easily say that Zelensky is currently (still) riding the same popularity wave.
But then, what has changed? The context.
In 2014, Crimea was freshly annexed; the conflict in Donbas was heading towards a downright slaughter and the country was engulfed in chaos. Poroshenko, as a newly elected president, raised all alarms and immediately ensured a consolidation of alliances through which he hoped to contain Russia’s influence on the conflict.
In 2019, the conflict is smouldering and both Ukraine and the West are tired of it. Poroshenko’s narrative has been played out and cynicism is rising to an all-time high. With the capture of Ukrainian sailors past November, it’s become clear that Black Sea regional security is becoming the new emphasis in Ukrainian foreign policy.
But president Zelensky is an inexperienced politician, who prides himself in having a young, motivated and “uncorrupted” team. This team has, so far, shown itself to be very limited in innovative and challenging ideas with regard to foreign policy. Zelensky’s ruthless criticism on Poroshenko during the pre-election period makes it all the more surprising that he brings absolutely nothing (notably) new to the table in this regard.
His current strategy will only work for a little while because, unlike his predecessor, Zelensky does not have five years to maintain the same narrative. His incredible popularity will undoubtedly suffer with every passing day that he fails to concretize his policy. Considering the complexity and ambiguity of foreign policy, Zelensky has to figure out how to run his international discourse, and he has to do it now.
Conclusions
On an international level, Ukraine has been the receiving and reacting actor for too long. If Zelensky wants to establish a strong foreign policy, his partnership with the EU and NATO has to reset the tone of the Ukrainian-Russian discourse. Instead of being the subject of Russian aggression, Ukraine has to switch the balance of power by resuming the role of initiator and reshaping its accommodating reputation. Of course, this can only be done if the Head of State actually has a plan in mind and has the necessary skill-set to navigate such a delicate policy.
But Zelensky must understand that there’s no use to beating a dead horse. Repeating the same words, in this case, means repeating the same mistakes and that can lead to an even more endangered Ukraine than it already is today. If Zelensky doesn’t come up with well-considered plans for the next five years, he will face the same fate as Poroshenko and be ostracized by the Ukrainian people.
Of course, no-one is expecting a complete shift in foreign relations. Poroshenko’s red line, after all, is one that a majority of Ukrainians sympathize with. Neither is it realistic to expect sudden policy shifts from our partners, who are dependent of their own internal development and usually have no interests in destabilizing their relationships. Yet new emphasizes can and must be made. This can – in part – be obtained by serious internal reforms, which Zelensky has started in his own, albeit particular, way. In the long run, however, internal stability and reliability will form a key advantage point when renegotiating partnerships and cooperation. The urgency of getting the country back in order and creating a concrete scheme for the next five years can’t be understated. Zelensky’s presidency has just started, but he’s already running out of time.
