For over a weekSerbia has been experiencing protests across the entire country. Concurrently, opposition parties in this Balkan nation have been organizing demonstrations that attract more and more participants. For insights into the developments in one of the key countries in Southern Europe and the potential implications for Russia, refer to the article in Apostrophe.
On Sunday, December 24, following prolonged anti-government protests, demonstrators briefly seized control of the capital's city hall. However, law enforcement swiftly reclaimed the building, detaining several dozens of participants. Subsequently, Serbian authorities alleged external interference, suggesting a purported warning received from Russian intelligence services about an attempt to overthrow the government.
The opposition coalition, in turn, alleges "government-backed hooligans." However, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic has stated that the disturbances following the parliamentary elections could have been provoked and organized from abroad with the aim of overthrowing the Serbian government.
‘This was an attempt at a forcible takeover of state institutions,’ stated the president to the pro-government television channel Pink TV.
The day after the incident, Vucic met with the Russian Federation's ambassador. Therefore, assistance from Russia may have more significant consequences than initially apparent.
Post-election escalation
Protests erupted immediately following the snap parliamentary elections on December 17. On that day, residents of Belgrade and several dozen other cities also held elections of their local leaders. The focal point of the current unrest is indeed Belgrade.
The opposition coalition Србија против насиља (‘Serbia Against Violence’), despite securing a record number of votes in parliament, will not be able to form a coalition. The electoral bloc with the emphatic name ‘Aleksandar Vucic – Serbia Shouldn't Stop’ clinched an absolute majority in parliament and will independently shape the new government. However, the situation with the capital city remains increasingly challenging.
‘Firstly, this constitutes more than a sixth of all voters. Secondly, it holds symbolic significance – if the government loses the capital, it signals the end of the era of Vucic and his team total dominance. Thirdly, it is in Belgrade where the opposition uncovered the most glaring irregularities, some of which were unprecedented, such as the importation of voters specifically for local elections from neighboring countries,’ Natalia Ischenko, the editor of the ‘Balkan Observer’ portal, points out.
According to one of the opposition leaders, Miroslav Aleksic, more than 40,000 ethnic Serbs living in the Republic of Srpska were brought to polling stations in Belgrade. This constitutes a segment of another state - neighboring Bosnia and Herzegovina.
‘The fact that citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina hold Serbian passports and participate in Serbian nationwide elections has been known. Some residents also have additional registration in Serbia, enabling them to vote in local elections. Such cases are considered normal for the region. However, the unprecedented aspect arises when thousands of individuals are centrally transported on buses to vote in local government elections. This has become a focal point of opposition criticism, aiming to highlight government overreach and irregularities’, Ischenko stresses.
Further from Russia, closer to the West
President of Serbia Aleksandar Vucic is a convenient figure for Western partners. Despite collaboration with Russia, the country maintains close ties with NATO and actively pursues European Union membership. According to sources within NATO leadership, Belgrade is the Alliance's second-priority partner after Kyiv, particularly in terms of supporting regional security in the Western Balkans.
Furthermore, Vucic has referred to Ukraine as a ‘friendly country’ and has previously asserted that Crimea and Donbas are sovereign territories of Ukraine. It is worth recalling the meeting between the presidents of Ukraine and Serbia in August of this year. Additionally, Serbian leadership has repeatedly mentioned the possibility of joining sanctions against Russia, indicating a willingness to do so if Serbia receives sufficient incentives, whether in the form of investments or other benefits.
‘Serbia's resistance to European integration is not rooted in a principled stance; rather, it is a strategic maneuver to negotiate the most favorable terms. In this pursuit, Serbia has played the card of special relations with Russia, leveraging not only economic ties but also political considerations. The Serbian leadership recognizes the deteriorating dynamics between Russia and the EU, as well as Russia and NATO, and is wary of appearing as a Trojan horse for Russia in Europe. They understand that this approach is becoming counterproductive and is causing complications for Serbia itself,’ Mykhailo Gonchar, president of the Center for Global Studies ‘Strategy XXI’, explains to Apostrophe.
Furthermore, on December 10, Serbia and Bulgaria completed the construction of a gas pipeline aimed at reducing their dependence on Russian gas.
‘The implementation of a corresponding construction program for various interconnectors is underway,’ Mykhailo Honchar explains. ‘This includes not only Russian gas via the Nord Stream but also Azerbaijani gas through the TANAP pipeline. Additionally, liquefied natural gas is being brought in through terminals in the south – in Greece and Turkey.’
According to him, Serbia maintains its pro-Russian stance, but realizing that Russia has positioned itself as an undesirable partner, they have decided to hedge their bets to minimize risks.
‘At least they no longer adhere to the stubborn position that Russian gas is all they need. Another factor is that the agreement between Russian Gazprom and Ukrainian Naftogaz will no longer be in effect from 2025, and Russian gas will cease to flow into Europe through the traditional route’, Honchar adds.
Another significant shift is the weakening of openly pro-Russian forces, a result of the parliamentary elections.
‘In Serbia, there's currently a period where the old pro-Russian forces have lost their influence. For instance, prominent pro-Russian and Serbian radicals like Vojislav Seselj and his Serbian Radical Party did not secure seats in parliament. Seselj, a war criminal, enjoys support from Russia. Relatively new faces of pro-Russian forces, represented by the parties Dveri Srpske and Zavetnici, also failed to gain parliamentary representation. However, the Russian Party has entered parliament for the first time, bearing its accurate name as it was supposedly established by the Russian national minority. Notably, even Vucic's party has pro-Russian inclinations, and their former coalition partners, the Socialists, are also pro-Russian. The key distinction lies in Vucic's party being more moderate in its pro-Russian stance, not directly controlled by Moscow but rather by Belgrade’, Ischenko explaines.
Bring Serbia back
Experts interviewed by Apostrophe do not rule out the possibility that there is an attempt in Serbia to halt the gradual shift of Belgrade away from Russia towards the EU and NATO.
‘It was previously believed that Vucic was attempting to balance, striving to act in a pro-Serbian manner while sitting on two chairs, ultimately seeking EU membership. However, recent days have turned everything upside down because he and his team have begun openly speaking in favor of Russian narratives,’ Ischenko says.
Furthermore, the European Parliament rapporteur on Kosovo, Viola von Cramon, referred to the attackers as ‘titushkas’ (athletically trained provocateurs; the name comes from Ukrainian athlete Vadym Titushko, who attacked journalists in 2013) and stated that this fits into the pattern of Russian interference.
‘Agents provocateurs. Classic KGB playbook. It is crucial now to maintain calm from all sides and not escalate violence further,’ von Cramon wrote in X.
Therefore, the ‘warning Vucic received from Russian intelligence appears to be an attempt to manipulate the Serbian leadership by playing on their fears.
‘Considering the traditionally strong pro-Russian sentiments in society and the political landscape, they could indeed be playing the ‘color revolution’ card. The Vucic regime is likely to react strongly to such developments, as any regime tends to perceive protests as maneuvers by its adversaries’, Honchar stresses.
All of this poses a danger from Russia to Europe as a whole.
‘If we look at the last two years, feeling squeezed out of Europe from various angles, including propagandist resources and diverse cultural centers, Russia has shifted the center of its subversive activities against Europe specifically to Serbia. This is due to the comfortable environment there and the concentrated potential of Russian intelligence services. In Serbia, they can stir up anything they deem necessary to maintain a pro-Russian and anti-Western model of behavior,' Honchar notes.
Whether the latest turn by Vucic and his team towards Moscow will be a lasting shift will become clear in the near future. Among other factors, it will depend on the reaction of Western partners to the crisis in Belgrade. For now, the notable meetings between the Serbian leadership and Russian diplomats are causing serious concern.
