The intelligence services of two Baltic countries have published annual reports on the state of international security and existing threats, which emphasize the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation against Ukraine.
Some conclusions were publishedon the website of the Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine.
Estonian intelligence
In the context of Ukraine, Estonian intelligence officers noted the following facts:
”The Kremlin's strategic priority is the neighboring region, where Ukraine and Belarus are the priority countries in maintaining Russia's sphere of influence. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has strived to secure economic and military dominance in the region and deflect any interference by competing international powers”.
”Russia continues its aggression against Ukraine. Russia is pressuring Ukraine to recognise the representatives of the occupying forces as legitimate negotiating partners. Russia’s occupation of Crimea continues, and no progress has been made towards a settlement of the conflict in the East of Ukraine, despite Ukraine’s efforts”.
”Reintegration of the occupied Donbas into Ukraine on the conditions dictated by the Kremlin is unacceptable to the Ukrainian authorities. Nevertheless, Russia is playing for time, expecting that an unresolved conflict will sooner or later force the Ukrainian leadership to make concessions”.
”The Russian side is increasingly blaming Ukraine for withdrawing from the Minsk Agreements… in particular, criticising the Ukrainian Parliament’s decision to rule out elections in the occupied Donbas”.
”The reality in the occupied territories of Eastern Ukraine is determined by the occupying powers, which can restore military pressure on Ukraine at any time with the help of Russian-led and equipped armed forces. The occupying forces have tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery and multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) in numbers that only a few European nations can match. The presence of such a threat in the occupied part of Ukraine, a European nation, is a clear sign of Russia’s unwillingness to renounce aggression”.
”Russia fully supports pro-Russian forces in Ukrainian politics, who want Russia’s sovereignty of Crimea to be recognized and the conflict in the East of Ukraine to be resolved on the terms dictated by Russia….In the run-up to elections in Ukraine, the Russian leadership extended particular hospitality to the politicians of the Ukrainian Opposition Platform For Life. President Putin’s longtime acquaintance, Ukrainian oligarch and member of Parliament Viktor Medvedchuk, is a frequent visitor with the Russian head of state. After such meetings, the main message sent to the public is a declaration of the inseparable destinies and close ties between Ukraine and Russia”.
”With such unabashed influence activities, Russia hopes to help Ukrainian political forces that would prefer to gravitate towards Moscow and oppose Ukraine’s chosen European path”.
«One of the main tasks of the Russian special services, apart from intelligence gathering in other countries, is to influence foreign populations in the Kremlin’s strategic interests».
«Russia sees psychological warfare as part of a comprehensive informational confrontation with the enemy (mainly Western countries). All three Russian special services – the FSB, SVR and GRU – are involved in covert influence operations, each with a different focus».
«According to the Russian Armed Forces’ doctrine, psychological warfare is one of the three main components of ‘informational confrontation’ – the other two being information-technical influencing foreign countries (e.g. through cyberattacks) and protecting Russia against foreign information operations».
«Russia sees psychological warfare as part of a comprehensive informational confron-tation with the enemy (mainly Western countries), and it is ongoing both during conflict and in peacetime».
«According to Russian doctrine, the targets of psychological warfare include the political leadership, military personnel and their families, the civilian population, and certain specific target groups, such as ethnic and religious minorities, opposition groups and businesspeople – in friendly, neutral and hostile foreign countries alike. This means that the entire world population outside Russia is a potential targe»t.
«In 2020, GRU-controlled English-language online portals (such as inforos.ru, infobrics.org and oneworld.press) disseminated false information about the COVID-19 pandemic to undermine the Western countries’ efforts to control the spread of the virus».
«Russia continues to be the primary security threat to Western democracies also in cyberspace. In addition to espionage, Russian special services are actively using cyberspace in their influence operations to create divisions in Western societies, transnational relations and NATO».
Lithuanian intelligence
The Department of State Security and the Military Intelligence of the Republic of Lithuania have published a joint “National Threat Assessment 2021”. In the context of Ukraine, Lithuanian colleagues are focusing on the Russian-occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, which have been identified as “a center of military instability on the threshold of NATO”. Instead, Moscow's attempts to impose its conditions on Kyiv in the context of forcing the reintegration of the Donbas with Russian-controlled local authorities, remain unsuccessful.
In particular, Lithuania's State Security Department focuses on the following factors:
The "National Threat Assessment 2021" of Lithuanian intelligence focuses on the following factors:
"Isolated, repressive and resentful Russia poses a major threat. Strengthening its power, Russia’s ruling regime imitates democratic processes but crushes its opponents. In terms of international relations, acting aggressively, Russian authorities increase their isolation and conflict possibilities. Russia has not abandoned its strategic objectives in the current and former members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), but it is struggling to achieve them".
"The military power remains the main tool for Russia to maintain and expand its influence abroad. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, Moscow announced its aims to deescalate military tension between Russia and NATO, but aggressive manoeuvres of the Russian Armed Forces near NATO borders proved the opposite. Russia’s preparedness to exert influence by confrontational – including military – means over its opponents will persist".
"Tactical nuclear weapons hold a special place in Russia’s military planning, since they fill the gap between strategic nuclear capabilities and conventional weaponry (e.g. tanks, artillery systems, war planes and war ships), which is still unable to reach Western quality standards. In addition, tactical nuclear weapons are a useful deception tool since it is impossible for the opponent to tell apart weapons of the same type that are armed with nuclear or conventional warheads. Russian tactical nuclear weapon arsenal is not restricted by any international treaties. Such constraints are unacceptable to Moscow and, therefore, it is highly unlikely that Russia will ever agree to accept other arms control agreements that put restrictions on tactical weapons".
In the context of Ukraine, Lithuanian intelligence is focusing on the Russian-occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions:
”The subordinated to Moscow 1st (Donetsk) and 2nd (Luhansk) Army Corps, consisting of brigades, battalions, companies and smaller units, and numbering approximately 30,000 to 35,000 servicemen, operate in the Russian-occupied districts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. At this, most of the servicemen are locals motivated by financial rewards. These units in organizational terms correspond to the model of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, they are commanded and trained by Russian officers and instructors. The Corps are equipped with Russian weapons, gear, communication systems, and operate on the basis of the statutes of the RF Armed Forces. Thus, they can be seamlessly integrated into the Russian forces or interact with units sent from Russia. Moscow can easily increase its military pressure on Kyiv by using military formations that are fully and unconditionally controlled by Russia. Some of the military who took part in the fighting against the Ukrainian Armed Forces or served in those ACs were recruited by Russian private military companies (such as the Wagner PMC), with whom they performed tasks in the interests of the Kremlin regime and oligarchs in other conflicts (Syria, Libya, etc.) ”.
Based on the results of the analysis, Lithuanianintelligence came to the following conclusions:
”Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been using “frozen conflicts” to interfere in the internal affairs of neighboring countries. However, this tool is gradually losing its effectiveness. Moscow's attempts to impose its conditions on Kyiv in the context of forcing the reintegration of the Donbas with Russian-controlled local authorities remain unsuccessful.The Kremlin will be unable to use the lever of its control over the Donbass to control Ukraine's foreign and domestic policies as long as Moscow's demands remain unacceptable to most Ukrainians”.